

Speech By

The Honourable Paul T. Hellyer

Minister of National Defence

to

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Gentlemen of the Canadian Club, may I say what a pleasure it is to speak to you today. I am honoured to have the opportunity to address such a distinguished audience.

The bulletin sent to you billed my speech as "Arms and the Man". I certainly have no quarrel with the title but, perhaps, it would have been more appropriate, with all due respect to Virgil and Shaw, to call it: "Arms and the Men" -- or "Arms and the Men and Women". Because, after all, that is what we are talking about, hundreds of thousands of service men and women -- those who have gone before us, those who are with us now, and those who will follow our times.

For those who have gone before, I have nothing but sincere respect and deep admiration. We are indebted to those people who believed so strongly in the democratic way of life that they were willing to risk all to ensure that it was preserved. We cannot permit ourselves to hold as inconsequential the sacrifice made by the men and women of the armed forces who fought to preserve our

heritage in two world wars and the Korean conflict. Neither can we discount the importance of the contribution our forces are making today in various trouble spots throughout the world. We must continue to appreciate the glories of the past as we prepare to meet the uncertainties of the future.

The new force concept being developed by our military Defence Staff -- which I am convinced is second-to-none in the world -- is based on what we sincerely believe to be the lessons of the past, the realities of the present and the probabilities of the future.

At the time I became Minister of National Defence in 1963, the three services each reported separately to the Minister or, more precisely, the three service chiefs had the right to report directly. There was, of course, the Chiefs of Staff Committee for the purpose of co-ordinating the material from the three services and for considering information from our NATO allies. The Chiefs of Staff Committee did not in most instances, however, set priorities in respect to the individual needs of the three services and, more often than not, merely considered a proposal from the technical standpoint and then forwarded it to the Minister for consideration and approval. But the services did not have to go through the Chiefs of Staff Committee; they

could report direct to the Minister and they often did.

The net result was that there was no real unity of planning. Different services planned for different kinds of war at the same time. There was no agreed strategy on which all services could base their plans. Similarly, in respect to equipment programmes, the services often came to the Minister direct with impressive demonstrations proving conclusively that a particular programme was essential. An initial estimate of the cost would be given. It was not unusual for the original estimate to be changed two or three times in the course of a few months and the ultimate cost often increased far above the original estimate.

With this kind of inadequate, unco-ordinated information, the Minister and the Cabinet Committee on Defence were not in a position to make intelligent decisions in respect to defence priorities. Once a project was approved and its costs began to sky-rocket, other equally important or more important programmes of one of the other services would have to be postponed or shelved completely due to the overall limitation of funds. The net result was a poorly balanced equipment programme and one that did not obtain the best value for the tax dollar being spent.

In 1959, for example, this kind of process led to a policy which only provided full equipment scales

for one Brigade Group of the Canadian Army. For the other three Brigade Groups training scales of equipment only were provided. In other words, of the whole Canadian Army, only one-quarter was provided with the operational equipment it would need in the event of hostilities.

Many serious shortages could be mentioned, but two examples will suffice. There was only sufficient Arctic clothing for one battalion. This was distributed on the basis of one company per battalion and, when we engaged in winter exercises with United States Forces in Alaska, it was necessary to collect clothing from the various units in order to equip one battalion to participate in the exercise. Similarly, there were only enough combat uniforms for one battalion. This was obviously an unsatisfactory state of affairs and one which, in my opinion, was a direct result of operating the three services as independent entities and of not having a co-ordinated and integrated defence policy.

In another respect, too, the Canadian taxpayers were not getting the best value for their tax dollar. There was a great deal of duplication and triplication among the services. To a large extent this resulted from the changes in technology which have occurred during the last thirty years. We live in a different world from that of the pre-war and World War II period and experience gained in that period is now, in many cases, pretty badly

out of date. The introduction of guided missiles, satellites, computers and automated systems has had a profound effect on military science.

The Royal Commission on Government Organization, known as the Glassco Commission, did a thorough study of our defence establishment and organization. It came to the conclusion that there was indeed a great deal of duplication and triplication and that a considerable amount of money could be saved by improved management and organization.

After only a brief period as Minister of National Defence I came to the same conclusion. Based on studies undertaken in the summer of 1963, I recommended to the Government and to Parliament some basic changes in defence policy which were included in the White Paper on Defence tabled in March, 1964.

The first fundamental change in defence policy was the proposed development of a well-equipped, well-trained, mobile force and the acquisition of airplanes and ships to transport it to any of the world's trouble spots where intervention of one or more of its units would be in the Canadian national interest.

The second fundamental change was in defence organization. It was agreed that we would integrate our Defence Headquarters and replace the three Chiefs of Staff and their committees by a single Chief of Defence Staff,

and one functionally oriented Defence Staff as the first step towards a single unified defence force for Canada.

Legislation based on the White Paper was referred to a special Parliamentary Defence Committee for consideration. The committee examined the proposals in detail. It called outside witnesses and following its deliberations, reported to the House of Commons. Its report was adopted by the House. The policy, therefore, became the policy not just of the Government, but of Canada.

On August 1, 1964, the legislation was proclaimed. The three service headquarters were reorganized into one Canadian Forces Headquarters and a single Chief of Defence Staff was appointed.

One of the unfortunate results of the recent controversy over the re-organization of the armed services, is that it has obscured the really significant progress that has been made toward achieving the new mobile force concept. The accomplishments of our military planners in developing a much more flexible force, with broader capabilities to participate in a wide range of potential conflict -- from the deterrence of nuclear war, through Korean-style limited war, to brush-fire wars, peace-restoring and peace-keeping operations -- has been truly remarkable.

It is being suggested, of course, that we are

going to convert the Canadian Forces into one giant peace-keeping organization with no capability beyond U.N. peace-keeping missions. This suggestion is tommyrot. If that were the objective, why on earth would we have launched a 1.5 billion dollar, 5-year re-equipment program? Why would we be acquiring self-propelled howitzers, armoured personnel carriers, armoured reconnaissance vehicles, anti-tank guns, anti-tank missiles, helicopter-equipped destroyers, ship-to-air missiles, modern submarines and fighter-bombers -- if the role was to be limited to peace-keeping? For that role alone, an order of blue berets and billy-sticks might suffice.

The policy was clearly set out in the White Paper. We stated that the best way to meet any demand for U.N. assistance would be from highly trained, well equipped conventional forces -- forces with sufficient flexibility to contribute to the deterrence of major war at one end of the spectrum to peace-keeping operations at the other end.

In a relatively short time -- just a few years -- we have greatly increased our fire power to the point where it is greater than ever in our history; substantially increased our mobility by air and sea; and provided our servicemen with a broad range of equipment to permit them to carry out this wide variety of missions. We plan to continue to expand our capabilities in all these areas.

It is, however, the integration/unification process that has caught the headlines. Therefore, I feel -- somewhat reluctantly -- that today I should stress this aspect -- despite the fact that it is really a means-to-an-end -- to implement a new concept of defence for Canada.

I think it is fair to say that "integration" has gained wide-spread acceptance both from within the forces and from the public. It has been hailed as an economical and more efficient method of military organization. One could almost say it has become an institution like motherhood, if there is any parallel between the two. At the present time it is having a little, not unexpected, trouble delivering its natural offspring, unification. But I am confident these current labour pains are temporary.

One of the difficulties is in semantics. Some people use the two words integration and unification interchangeably. Other people tend to consider them as two completely separate ideas.

In actual fact, there is no clear dividing line between integration and unification. They are components of one cycle. The integration of the three services at the headquarters, command and base levels was authorized by an amendment to the National Defence Act in 1964. Since then, re-organization has been implemented in a step-by-step, planned manner -- the overall policy established by the

Government but the detailed implementation by the military -- as it should be. The next amendment to the National Defence Act will again be permissive legislation: this time to allow the creation of a single armed force.

But -- and I cannot state this too strongly -- integration-to-unification is a series of interlocking steps designed to provide for Canada the best military force possible to meet our international obligations for a reasonable expenditure. It is quite difficult to determine any clear break between them because there was never intended to be any. Integration is actually the first phase of the total process of unification.

Charges have been levelled that, at the outset, "integration" was all we had in mind; that we are now rushing into unification because -- somehow -- I may achieve some personal, political gain in doing so.

I can state categorically that this is not so.

Let me quote to you from a statement made by the then Associate Minister, Mr. Cardin, and myself on April 2, 1964, to all members of the armed forces six days after tabling the White Paper on Defence.

"The third and final step will be the unification of the three services.....

It is reasonable to expect that it will be three or four years before it will be possible to take this action."

We also stated in the next paragraph:

"However, the end objective of a single service is firm."

As you can see from this statement which was widely distributed through bulletin boards, daily routine orders, etc., throughout our service establishments, there could never have been any doubt that unification was clearly the objective and that this was the approximate time frame.

As for the "personal interest" suggestion, I think it is fair to say that we are proceeding despite -- not because of -- any personal considerations. Believe me gentlemen, it would have been far easier to sit back and rest on our laurels, basking in the applause of something called "integration", and let some future defence minister take on the inevitable emotional upheaval associated with the final stages of unification. However, such a decision -- regardless of its attraction -- was unthinkable. It would have been grossly unfair to you the taxpayer and to the men and women of the forces.

It would mean that we had done only half a job; that we had, in fact, been unprepared or unwilling to fulfill our obligations -- due to narrow political considerations. If this programme is not carried to completion, many of the anomalies and inequities that still exist will continue to plague us.

Are we moving too fast? Are we carrying out the programme without due thought and consideration?

No we are not. The initial planning of the integration to unification process began over three years ago when I assumed office in 1963. One year later the White Paper was issued outlining the pattern we would follow. The paper came as a result of months of concentrated study.

The White Paper itself set out our long-range objectives and goals. In order for the programme to be effective, it has been and is being subjected to the closest scrutiny. Every area is being researched to determine the best method of implementing the changes.

It is a very complex process covering all aspects of training, supply, finance, organization, logistics and all that which goes into the makeup of a military force.

Because of this, unification, assuming legislation is passed this fall, will not become a total reality until approximately 1970 when all the planning and implementation is completed. Thus the whole process will have taken about seven years.

I do not think this is rushing into the matter headlong. I do not think this indicates we are making rash decisions; that we aren't considering our actions

carefully. Our military planning groups are burning the midnight oil so that we may meet our obligations to our allies, to our servicemen, and to the people of Canada.

I am proud of their conscientious efforts.

To charge me -- and through me, them -- with precipitous action is a shocking disregard for the facts -- and their hard work.

You know, it's difficult to please everybody. There are many people who feel we aren't proceeding with unification quickly enough. Some of them have suggested the formation of a group called DUET, meaning: Demand Unification Effective Today. It's an entertaining thought, but nevertheless an impractical one.

We need the unification legislation soon to get on with the job in an orderly fashion. But "instant unification" is just not possible.

The charge has been made that there have been no apparent economies achieved by the integration-to-unification process. This is false.

Let's look first at Canadian Forces Headquarters. Already we are operating the Headquarters with 2,000 less personnel, and when the re-organization is completed, the improvement in efficiency will enable us to do the work with 30% less staff.

In the field of training there has already been a 13% reduction in staff, and with the consolidation of the

previous 350 listed trades in the three services to less than 100 trades, more economies in training will be achieved.

The ultimate saving by Training Command is estimated at approximately 30% of the current force which in dollars will represent a saving between \$35 million and \$50 million annually. This is expected to be achieved by 1969.

Mobile Command now operates its headquarters with substantially less officers and men than were required in the previous geographic organizations. Consequently, these personnel can be used in other areas of greater need.

An integrated intelligence organization is now operating just as effectively as did the four separate establishments prior to integration and with a 30% overall saving amounting to \$5 million annually.

Materiel Command has achieved a 26% saving in personnel in its cataloguing section alone. After a single automated system of supply is implemented the command confidently predicts a 30% overall reduction and saving in manpower and inventory -- to say nothing of the increased effectiveness through computerization.

Some other areas of saving I will mention briefly are in Construction Engineering, 44% at Headquarters and 30% across Canada; Recruiting, 33%; Canadian Joint Staff London, 44%; Canadian Joint Staff Washington, 34%.

We are indeed affecting significant economies in our integration-to-unification programme. I could mention more but I hope the examples given will suffice.

Service morale is another area that has come under attack. Some observers say it is at its lowest ebb in history. Well, I simply do not accept this contention. Nor do the members of the Defence Staff -- it just is not so!

On the other hand, we have not said: "It is excellent" or "It is at an all-time high" as has been alleged.

We recognize that in a period of change there will be uncertainty -- and this will have some effect on morale. The same thing applies when company mergers take place. But, as uncertainty evaporates with knowledge of plans and intentions, morale usually rises sharply. Certainly, that has been our experience with the majority of those who have become involved in the integration process -- they have quickly recognized its challenges and its advantages.

Morale is affected by many things, not the least of which are career opportunities, promotion prospects, public appreciation, pay and allowances, housing, and a host of other factors that affect the individual and his family. These are areas of continuing concern and we are vigorously seeking improvement. Better promotion prospects; better travel and living allowances; better conditions of service; and the new pay raise announced last week should go a long way

toward alleviating the situation.

The following statistics may give some measure of the true situation. In the first six months of this year the Navy reports a 13% increase in re-engagements over 1965. The Army is up 11% over last year and the Air Force 2%. By the way, that brings the RCAF re-engagement rate to an impressive 84% -- most satisfying.

Figures on voluntary releases for 1966 are not yet available but in 1965, one full year following the announcement of our intentions to unify the forces, the total number of voluntary releases decreased by 32.

In other words, voluntary releases have diminished and re-engagements have increased -- despite the hue and cry about the state of the forces.

Don't misunderstand me, although recruiting in general is good, we still need a larger intake of new recruits to keep the force strong. This is particularly true because of the large number of World War II and Korean veterans who are coming to normal retirement age in this period.

One of the most mystifying statements -- from retired people -- is that we are trying to hybridize the serviceman, making him a jack-of-all-trades and master-of-none. That one is a dandy!

Let me say emphatically and categorically that hybridization will be left to the biologists. It is

sheer uninformed, unadulterated, poppycock to suggest that we are proposing to make a force of "jacks-of-all-trades".

I have been saying this "ad nauseum" for three years but let me once again repeat. Airplane pilots will not be required to "pilot" a ship; infantrymen will not have to repair airplanes; airframe technicians will not have to man an anti-tank battery. The job functions will remain as always to those who are trained for them -- just as they are in the separate services. For instance, in the RCAF no one suggests that a trained Flight Lieutenant Supply Officer be one day at his desk, the next day behind the controls of a 1500-MPH Starfighter, and the third day in the Operating Room at a Military Hospital.

The degree of specialization required of the serviceman in the single force will be as great as required in separate forces.

Certain specialists may serve in different environments where applicable. For example, a pay specialist could just as easily serve at Camp Petawawa as Uplands Air Force Base, and still perform his job effectively -- So can some radar technicians or many other trades for that matter.

However -- and this is important -- those who are now serving in the forces will not be required to change from one combat environment to another unless they

volunteer to do so.

That is all very well, you may suggest, but why can you not also retain the distinctive identity traditionally associated with sea, land and air, and still accomplish everything you have in mind? Why do you have to amalgamate the Navy, Army and Air Force into a single armed force?

The reasons are to a certain degree psychological -- but, they are, nevertheless, very real. We want the traditional loyalty to and identity with a single environment broadened to embrace the force as a whole. Strong loyalty to and identification with a single environment is no longer good enough. It has been overtaken by the technological revolution which is all around us. As long as there are three separate services there is a problem of representation. Each service wants and often demands its share of available positions. This applies to some extent in the Commands and to a very large extent in Headquarters at all levels.

It has already been suggested that the next Chief of Defence Staff should be a Navy man. To those who suggest it I reply that the next CDS might well be Navy. On the other hand, he might not be, he might be of Army or Air Force origin. The consideration which should be paramount and which should over-ride all others is finding the very best qualified person for the job.

This same criterion must apply for many other positions in Headquarters, in Commands, and at Bases. There are some positions, of course, where a special expertise and a particular professional discipline are required. These are few in number at superior headquarters, however, compared to the very large number of staff jobs which should be filled in each case by the best men available regardless of what specialty they might have been trained in during the earlier stages of their careers.

This can only be achieved if there is no requirement to provide a colour balance -- when there is no service politics pushing for advantage. With three separate services working together in integrated Commands there are situations in which each is a minority. This inevitably creates problems.

Inter-service rivalry and fears can reach the point where they interfere with the kind of co-operation that is essential in a modern military force, especially in wartime but also in peacetime. In a recent mess conversation, a number of Army officers were seriously arguing that the proposal to unify the forces was an Air Force plot to take over the Army. Only a few nights earlier, in an Air Force mess, the focus of conversation revolved around the proposition that the result of unification would be the Army taking over the Air Force. Meanwhile, in Navy messes some people were saying they

wanted nothing to do with either of the other services.

To train officers then to, above all, be loyal to a single environment is just not relevant in the second half of the 20th century. We must train officers who, although naturally partial to their own particular specialty, can easily manage, due to their identification with the force as a whole, to consider problems objectively and to recommend solutions which will be in the best interests of the force as a whole and of Canada.

Unification is also essential to provide better and fairer career prospects for service personnel. Under a system of separate services, career opportunities are naturally limited to the scope, tasks and requirements of the individual service. Integration provides some additional outlet, but this is limited, normally to the senior management level, compared to the broad opportunities and advantages presented by a single force.

Another facet of career prospects is the improvement of promotion opportunities for the more able personnel. From a broader base of selection it will be possible to identify, develop and appoint the best qualified to the more senior ranks. Artificial barriers created by service affiliation and the need for representation on staffs by service will be eliminated in the long term. Standardized career planning under unification will afford equitable opportunity. The challenges and

opportunities for the gifted individual will be much greater than could ever be possible in a system of separate services.

Unification will also enhance our ability to react to changing requirements. For instance, no longer will we be forced to release well-qualified and service-motivated personnel from one service, due to a change in role for that service, when they could be used in another arm. Examples of such a waste are legion. Such narrow utilization of expensively-trained personnel is bad for the nation, bad for the Armed Forces as a whole, and bad for the individual who is victimized by the system.

A common walking-out or office uniform is an essential part of the identification with the force as a whole -- although, and I emphasize, any suggestion that we propose to put all 105,000 members of the forces into a new uniform by next July cannot be made seriously by anyone with military experience. The introduction of a uniform -- particularly when it is the intention to make it the best procurable in style, cut and material -- is a long process, beginning with user-trials, reports, possible improvements and then a carefully planned introduction, taking into account such factors as current stocks. Preliminary studies indicate this process, once approved, will take four or five years.

It will certainly be possible to maintain identity at the unit level with sufficient variety of dress uniforms for ceremonial occasions. Colour and pageantry have a very real and important place in a peacetime force. This is one of the reasons why from the outset we decided that the regimental system would remain.

On the other hand, the day-to-day business of the armed forces in any country is to provide the maximum of military effectiveness possible for the money being spent. A unified force, composed of the specialties in all arms, but managed by officers who have been trained to be loyal to and identified with the application of the force as a whole, will be the best means of providing that effectiveness.

The idea of a single force is not new. It has been supported by some of the greatest military men of the century. General Eisenhower, General MacArthur, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris and others including several distinguished Canadians. One of these is General Charles Foulkes, former Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Let me quote from General Foulkes' writings to show what I mean.

"We need one single Armed Service,
under one supreme Chief of Staff, in
one uniform. We need to organize our