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## Japan's Manchurian Policy and Its Affect on World Peace

BY DR. T. Z. KOO.

COL. BISHOP:—On January 2, 1932, the Canadian Club had the real pleasure and privilege of listening to Dr. Koo and we extend to him today a very hearty welcome. At that time, the subject of his address was "Manchuria." Today, Dr. Koo is going to tell us about "Japan's Manchurian Policy and Its Affect on World Peace." Dr. Koo.

DR. KOO:—Mr. Chairman, members of the Canadian Club, I am very glad to be back here among you again, because each time I come you give a gracious welcome. What I would like to do is to try and give you, in a few words, what has happened between China and Japan during the last three or four years, since I spoke to the Club last time and, in that way, bring the members up to date so far as developments in the Far East are concerned.

In order to appreciate what has taken place between China and Japan since the trouble in Manchuria, I think I will ask you in your mind to go back to the time when the League of Nations tribunal discussed the matter. Since that time we have faced already three definite crises between China and Japan—almost one a year: One in 1933, one in 1934 and one in this present year.

The first crisis between China and Japan developed out of the war situation in Manchuria, which was left by the League of Nations. You very well know that, following the report made to the League by the specially appointed Commission, nothing very serious was done to implement that report, except the recommendation concerning the creation of the new state of Manchukuo, that the nations who

are bonded together in the League of Nations should withhold their recognition of this new state. Now some of you perhaps may recall that the moment that that proposal was made, a number of people rather cynically questioned the wisdom of withholding recognition of this new state because, they say, we have already seen the existence of this new state. It has come up in the League, whether we recognize it or not, it is going to be there, so why create the difficulty of non-recognition. Those who live in the Far East have seen this idea and policy of non-recognition beginning to function in a very peculiar way. Because of this non-recognition by the League of Nations—accepted by all member states with the exception of Japan and the little country of San Salvador, it is beginning to exert some influence in a very curious way, as we notice in the Far East, the struggle between Japan and the League States over this subject. Because of non-recognition, Japan's home in Manchuria is still rather uncertain, lacking official recognition from other countries. It has put Japan in the position of being a robber in another man's house. The Japanese are a rather sensitive people and it is a rather intolerable position.

And so we have seen in the last two or three years these influences — non-recognition and this feeling of being a robber in another man's house. It may be likened to two pieces of sand-paper grating against each other. We will see which side is going to wear through first. It would be natural to try and break through the idea of non-recognition. What is a better way than to get China to give recognition to the new state? Because Japan could say, even China has given recognition; why should other nations hold back? So, very early in 1931 she came to China, at first with a series of inducements. She wondered if China would accede to her desire in having the new state recognized by us, if in return Japan would give certain things back for that privilege. She suggested perhaps Japan would be willing to waive certain extra territorial rights with China. But China stood firm in these things and said, "We stand by the League of Nations." When Japan found she could not induce the Chinese Government to do these things she

tried another tack. She indicated that she would resort to military force and take another strip of land. China stood by the position of the League. When she found this would not work, she tried still another tack. She suggested to the Chinese Government that something should be done about this railway travel between Manchuria and China. Before the occupation of Manchuria we usually had the Chinese railway running through the Great Wall into Manchuria. The Japanese stressed the inconvenience of travel and wondered why the Chinese could not arrange for through traffic as she had done for years. If China did so it would mean that the Chinese Government would have to give recognition to the new government in Manchuria. The Chinese government contended that there were so few passengers going through, so why worry about it? That did not satisfy the Japanese, so they exerted pressure for two or three months. The way the Chinese Government dealt with the situation will show the anxiety to avoid, as far as possible, any recognition of the new state.

The railway offices at Peking and Mukden involved the two governments, and so instead of selling the railway tickets at the railway road offices, the railway offices empowered a tourist agency to sell the tickets, careful to avoid recognition of the new state. That will give you an insight into the crisis between China and Japan in 1933, after the League of Nations dropped the matter.

From that first crisis came the impetus for the second trouble in 1934, when Japan could not get the Chinese to waive their stand on the recognition business. They said, why not go to China frankly and let us try and forget, let bygones be bygones and let us try and begin a new era of friendship and co-operation between China and Japan. So she came to us and said, now China and Japan, you can see from the map, are geographical neighbors, why should we be always fighting? Cannot there be something done to stop it and usher in an era of friendship? China said, we do not want to fight. Please define what you mean by an era of friendship and co-operation. It would mean that Japan expected China to do four things. First, call back all anti-Japanese demonstrations, including trade boycott.

If China would do this it would indicate a willingness to be friends. Second, China should withdraw from the League of Nations because Japan has withdrawn from the League of Nations. We would be expressing sympathy with her position. Third, China and Japan should enter into some kind of economic co-operation and in economic co-operation, three things were mentioned. First, that China could perhaps lower tariffs on various goods, particularly textiles. Second, China should not concentrate on developing raw materials. Third, if in financial difficulties China should go to Japan and not to any other country. Fourth, military co-operation, particularizing two services of national defence, mentioning the air force and the new armies the Central Government is building up in China today. The air force is at present developed largely by instructors from the United States and the army is being trained by German officers. Japan said, "You should stop these American and German officers and take Japanese officers into your air force and army. These were the Japanese suggestions intended to initiate an era of friendship and co-operation. You can very well see if we had accepted these four suggestions we could not help but be friends with Japan. Of course.

I think it would be of interest to you for me to take just a moment to show how China tried to meet that situation. While we do not lack man-power we are still lacking in one fundamental, since China is still predominantly agricultural. Therefore, in case of war we have to depend upon munitions from abroad. You can see that a clash with Japan could be complicated. Because of that fundamental situation you cannot say yes or no. You have always to say yes and no in the same breath. You will see what has happened on these four things. On the first issue China said, "Yes, we will call off all anti-Japanese demonstrations." Last May the government went so far as to issue a mandate to make it a criminal offence to speak of Japan in any unfriendly way. You can see how far the Chinese Government has gone. China has gone pretty far in trying to meet Japanese wishes. On the second issue, China has said, "No, we prefer to stand by the League of Nations," while feeling that

our co-operation with the League is considerably hampered. Before 1933, China had experts from the League assisting in the re-organization of the educational, economic and public health services. Japan put her foot down on economic developments. So after these experts returned nothing happened. While we see China still with League co-operation the League has weakened.

On the third issue, economic co-operation. On the first issue China did something to meet with the wishes of Japan. China decided to revise the tariff on certain Japanese articles, giving a lower rate. But we wished to concentrate our attention on the field of raw material, because we are anxious to develop certain forms of basic industries so that we shall not be dependent entirely on the outside world.

On the fourth issue of military experts, Japan had objected to American instructors, so last year the Chinese Government employed six new instructors from Italy. So "yes" to one and "no" to another. The military business would have put the army under Japanese officers. Again yes and no. The Chinese Government said, "No." You have to soften it a little bit and so China appointed four Japanese naval instructors. China, you know, has no navy so you can afford to appoint navy instructors. So you can see some of the situations in which China has been placed and how she has tried to meet these situations and tried to hold on to the League of Nations. That was the situation in 1934 and in 1935 Japan said, "If you do not give way on the points that really matter you are not sincere." The charge of insincerity was followed by an appeal to the Chinese Government. The Japanese said that it was no use to deal with China by negotiation and indicated there could be war. That is what happened in June of this year. One of the military officers came over to bargain and presented a series of demands, setting the time limit as expiring August 31. I am not going to bother you with details of the demands. But they fell into three groups. In the first place, they sought certain military rights. That group of demands was aimed a little bit at Russia. The second group was intended to remove from North China, as far as pos-

sible, every vestige of Central Government influence in that area because the Central Government could hold that province together. If Japan could eradicate the influence of the Central Government, then the way would be much easier for her; so that any governor, loyal to the Central Government, must go out. The purpose of the third group is directed at the Central Government itself, and is intended to eliminate from the Central Government those persons and influences which still stand out against Japan.

At the present moment we still have a large bloc in the Central Government that have refused to compromise with Japan.

So the Chinese Government is supposed to name a Commander-in-Chief who is at least acceptable to Japan and every Chinese army division should have a Japanese officer attached to it.

When you see the nature of these demands you realize why the Chinese Government has kept on so long without doing anything about them, because it is a situation where you can say neither yes nor no. Well, the time limit has expired, August 31, and nothing very serious in a military way has happened between China and Japan, but the next few weeks will be very critical.

Perhaps I should say a word more about China's attitude. You will probably be surprised as I was when I returned from China because, instead of a sad opinion and hopelessness, I found the opposite. There is a modern atmosphere and a spirit of up-and-doing. The last three years have seen a vast development in political coherence, so that many of the governments, that used to hold out against the Central Government, have come in. When we started out, we had only three provinces supporting the Central Government and now all provinces, except three, are supporting the government and even these last three have begun to come within the sphere of the Central Government. In addition to that political coherence, another thing that has made government more articulate in every part of China has been the rapid development in communication. I was in the Northwest of China and there was one stretch of territory which, if I had travelled by ordinary

means, it would have taken four to six days. But fortunately we now have aeroplanes and I was able to travel the distance in two hours and fifty minutes. In a way the development is simply tremendous.

What is the danger point between China and Japan? The danger point lies in the fact that we have been driven in the last four years since the Manchurian trouble, until we feel we have yielded everything we can possibly yield. We cannot yield very much more. When that conviction begins to spread you will see something desperate will happen. I am sorry to say the indications of the last week or ten days express the feelings that we cannot yield very much more. Yet even if it is a hopeless struggle we have to take up the struggle in a military way and that is where the situation is rather difficult. We must not think that everybody in Japan wants this type of thing in China. What is the danger? You have in English a phrase which, I am sure, could be used here. You say "a screw is loose." If you study the Japanese situation you find that two screws are loose. One screw between the military and civil army. In Central European countries the civil controls the military. In Japan the military controls the civil. You can see that is a dangerous situation. There is a second screw loose between the military and the military. There is a screw loose because the general staff of occupation in Manchuria can find sufficient reason to start action independent of headquarters in Tokio. In other words, the head of the whole defence force in Japan does not always control his staff in the field. You can, therefore, see that the staff in the field could involve general headquarters without the latter wanting to be involved. I think many Japanese see that. So there is going to be a keen struggle in Japan on the part of the civil to hold the military in check.

The Finance Minister in Tokio must go on with a military campaign, but we have not got money. If the military group maintains control, I think a war between my country and Russia and Japan will be very hard to avoid. So far as it affects Western world peace I am going to say, first, that while we face this difficult international situation, I think we have a distinct obligation. We have taken upon

ourselves to fight against this rising tide of hostility and distrust and hatred that has risen on both sides of the Pacific. So far as Japan is concerned, you can see that the danger of war complicates the situation.

I think the Canadian nation is in a position to help us on both sides of the Pacific, both because you are detached—because you can see far better than my country and the United States. You are far less involved. We have to do everything we can to fight against the rising tide of hatred on both sides of the Pacific. When I think of my boy, now fourteen years old—when this Japanese situation arose he was nine years old. I asked him what he wanted me to bring him. He said, "I want some marbles." Less than two minutes later, he said, "I do not want marbles. I want a big gun and warships." You see what is happening even with the youth of China. In our efforts for peace we must recognize that the next, immediate, practical step is to try and find something which the nations can do, which will be effective in stopping any nation on the point of war. That is the first thing. The next thing I want to say, if we have to do anything effective in the cause of peace, we must do it now in co-operation with other nations.

I want to thank you for giving me such a patient hearing.

COL. BISHOP:—I do not know which to admire most—Dr. Koo's subject matter or the complete ease and facility with which he speaks English and wanders through our synonyms. We in Canada are friends of both countries—China and Japan, but we have obligations to the League of Nations to which we are signatories. I think you will agree that Dr. Koo's address presents us with a detached view of both sides, rather than a biased view.