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The Problem of the Saar

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PRESIDENT JAMES:—Dr. Lange and members of the Canadian Club of Toronto, during the past few months public attention has been focussed on the problem of the Saar. The plebiscite to determine its future was voted on yesterday and the result, we are told, will be announced tomorrow. Under these circumstances, we are particularly fortunate to have as our guest speaker today Dr. Lange, who is at present on the staff of University College. Dr. Lange is one of the younger generation of Germans. He has not permitted me to disclose his age. His father is at this time on the Supreme Court Bench of Leipzig. Dr. Lange was born and educated in Germany and he has also studied in France. During the past four years he has been on the staff of the German department of the University of Toronto. I am sure we shall look forward with very real interest to what he has now to say to us. Dr. Lange.

DR. LANGE:—Mr. President and Gentlemen, the game of international politics has for some time past been enlivened by the frequent introduction of what is commonly called a crisis. There was not so long ago the Austro-German crisis, the Franco-Polish crisis, the Balkan crisis and, most recently of all with its climax only yesterday, the crisis of the Saar.

Not only those immediately concerned. France and Germany, but almost the whole world have taken the development of the Saar problem during the past years as a barometer for the European political temperature. The portentous machinery of the League of Nations, as a guardian of all that is sacredly decreed in the Treaty of Versailles, has been set in motion not only to ensure a

smoothly working plebiscite, but, as we shall see, to vindicate its reputation as an international umpire.

A plebiscite took place yesterday, (the results of which unfortunately are not yet clearly known), which will prove to be of the utmost importance for the relations not only between France and Germany but between all signatories of the Treaty of Versailles. A plebiscite such as was held not very long after the conclusion of the Versailles agreements in East and West Prussia and Upper Silesia. It was carried on in a territory of some 730 square miles nowhere broader than 22 miles, or longer than 47, approximately the size of Manhattan, with over 800,000 inhabitants, the most densely inhabited area of the size in Europe, and an almost entirely German-speaking population, more than 70% Roman Catholics, largely employed in the principal Saar industries, metal, glass, pottery, or at work in the coalfields which are, after those of the Ruhr and Upper Silesia, the most important in Europe. A territory which being a so-called buffer district between France and Germany, in which economic and strategic interests come together, has constituted ever since 1919 an element of friction and unrest in Europe.

The issues of yesterday's vote were clear enough. Did those 800,000 people wish to continue the present regime under the League of Nations,—did they, as one might expect they would, wish to return to Germany, or would they place themselves under French rule? The issues are simple and yet unfortunately such problems are not usually solved along the lines dictated by logic or common sense.

The Saar problem is the problem of Europe because, until it is solved satisfactorily, once and for all, there is not the faintest possibility of Franco-German reconciliation, nor the smallest chance of Europe settling down to a normal way of life.

The whole Saar question is one of many unhappy children of the Treaty of Versailles. Let me, therefore, take you back to the days in March, 1919, when that part of the Peace Treaty which was to settle French claims for moral and material compensation was being discussed. When the French expert Tardieu, who has given us his

own version of those months, put forward the French contention that on both historical and economic grounds France had every right to annex temporarily or permanently the admittedly German Saar territory.

Both Lloyd George and Wilson, however, resolutely opposed such an attitude, urging that France had never, neither during the war nor in any previous discussion, advanced such a claim before.

Wilson reminded Clemenceau that France had already been given the rich mineral districts of German Lorraine and that the repair of certain mines which the Germans had flooded in Northern France was only a question of time and money which was to come out of German pockets.

At this moment of the conversation, Clemenceau dramatically introduced a new argument which, apparently, no one was in a position to challenge. There are, he said, 150,000 Frenchmen in the Saar. Have not they, too, according to the universally applicable principle of self-determination, have not they, too, a right to speak for themselves? 150,000 Frenchmen out of 750,000 Saarlanders which had in no previous discussions ever been mentioned. And perhaps it was characteristic of the amazing geographical and historical uncertainty of most of those responsible for the Treaty that not one of the experts even thought of checking this statement. The official census of the year 1913 would have shown them that not 150,000 but 339 out of the total Saar population had given French as their mother-tongue. It was, never the less, on the ground of this preposterous legend of the 150,000 Frenchmen that the American and English delegates finally agreed to admit any French claim over the Saar at all.

But there can be no doubt that the object of the Saar Statute, as that part of the Treaty of Versailles was eventually called, was not primarily political in a wider sense but economic as far as the French attempt was concerned, to compensate their war losses in coal and steel by gaining complete, even if temporarily limited, control over the mineral wealth of the Saar basin. Both as a centre of iron and steel manufacture and as a coal exporter, the Saar territory is, as you know, of considerable importance.

In addition to the 31 coal mines employing in 1933, that is at the height of depression, approximately 46,000 workers, there are 5 iron and steel plants employing over 23,000 men.

Now let us consider the matter from the French point of view. Through the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine, France suddenly found herself after the war one of the chief producers of iron and steel in Europe. The increased output could not be consumed in France itself. The possibilities of export depended upon low-priced production because of the severe competition from Germany, Great Britain and Belgium, and unless France could dispose of the surplus production from Alsace-Lorraine, there was every reason to expect serious discontent and unrest at the change of regime. So, for purely home political reasons, France was compelled to find export markets for Alsatian iron and steel. This was, as I said before, largely a matter of low cost of production. Now it is well known that France even before the war, had far less coal of her own than she needed, the discrepancy increased with the ceding of Alsace-Lorraine which consumed vast quantities of coal but produced almost none. The only place from which France could get coal for Alsace was Germany, but, say the French, nothing could be simpler for Germany, if it so desired, than to manipulate the price of coal so as to make Alsatian iron and steel too dear for export. To minimize this danger, this was the argument, France must hold the Saar.

In its final form, the Treaty of Versailles required Germany to cede the mines to France "in full and absolute possession with exclusive rights of exploitation unencumbered and free from all debts and charges of any kind." Such possession and exploitation to continue for 15 years, that is to 1935, when the inhabitants were to declare their wishes as to the future sovereignty of the region, and on that decision was to depend the right of Germany to buy back the mines. For the same period of time, the Saar was made part of the French customs area and the franc became the new currency unit. Within a week after the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles French authorities

were able to take possession of the mines, which have since been worked and managed as a French State enterprise. You can imagine that, as the mines were taken over free from all liabilities, the loss inflicted upon private individuals was considerable. Existing contracts, easements and other rights were repudiated, the victims of such an expropriation were left to obtain compensation from Germany.

From the very beginning, pressure was brought to bear on the larger German undertakings in the iron and steel industries, with a view to the introduction of French private capital. The threat of refusal to supply coal and of many other disadvantages led numerous companies and firms to submit, with the result that four out of five leading steel plants in the Saar are today under French, Belgian or Luxemburg control to the extent of more than 60%.

The only enterprise which during the entire period of industrial occupation, escaped the infiltration of French capital, was the steel works at Volklingen, with the result that coal was supplied to the Volk works at a considerably higher price than to rivals.

From the first it was, very naturally, the intention of the French Government to extract from the mines as much coal as possible as long as they remained in French possession—their future efficiency may not always have been a matter of over scrupulous consideration. At any rate, the position of the mines, as far as the possibility of an eventual transfer of ownership was concerned, is not quite the same as that of the privately-owned iron and steel industry. They have remained in the ownership of the French Government and, according to the Franco-German agreement of 1934, will have to be ceded in case of a vote in favor of Germany, together with all railways, customs stations, and other immovable property in the Saar against payments by Germany of a lump sum of 900 million gold francs.

The Saar territory is economically, of course, not independent. In 1913, 83% of the coal and 71% of the iron produced in the Saar remained within the German Customs area. If the time were at my disposal I should attempt to show you that its economic connections, not

only with France and Luxembourg, but particularly with Southern Germany, are of such a nature that it is difficult to believe the assertion of certain not wholly disinterested experts that it forms an economic unit with the French Alsace-Lorraine, and that its natural market lies to the west.

However that may be, I have tried to show you the tremendous importance of the economic issue at stake. But while these economic considerations primarily concerned France and Germany, it was, according to the Statute, to be the function of a commission of the League of Nations to govern the Saar district "in accordance with the wishes of the population" whose "rights and well-being" were to be guaranteed.

As to the degree of success of this measure, each side of the Rhine will probably give you a different answer. But on the whole, I should think, especially in later years, there can be no doubt that the Commission of Five—a Frenchman, a native resident of the Saar not being a French national, and representatives of 3 countries other than France and Germany—that this Commission has, often under exceedingly trying circumstances, acted with the utmost possible fairness. Only in two instances, I think, have very serious psychological blunders been committed, the one by the disregard of the religious susceptibilities of the inhabitants, the other by the effort of the French authorities, at times assisted by the Commission, to insinuate French influence and discourage the use of the German Language. The Roman Catholicism of the Saar region is in dogma and ritual essentially different from that of the French or Italian. The attempt to transfer the Roman Catholics from German to French bishoprics had, therefore, finally to be abandoned as hopeless, so that the region is still divided between the dioceses of Trier and Speyer.

The Statute provided that the inhabitants should "retain their schools and their language." This they have done, of course, but the Statute also empowered the mine administration to set up either primary or technical schools for the employees of the mines and their children, and to

arrange for instruction to be given in French. The necessity for actually organizing these schools, more than 20 of which exist all through the territory, is not altogether obvious—for the children of immigrant French miners cheaper and less offensive provisions might have been made.

But it is only natural that in the exposition of the German point of view, a great many further instances should have been cited of French attempts at cultural aggressiveness, that most of the chairmen and members of the Governing Committee should have been accused of altogether too obvious pro-French sympathies, that a strong separatist movement should be said to have had the active support, not only of the League Commission but also of the French Government. But whatever the truth of these allegations may be, I think it is safe to say that long before the plebiscite was in sight, the French had given up not only their hope but their intention of making the Saar a part of France. No sensible Frenchman, I think, ever had any desire to see the purely German population of France increased by the addition of, say 800,000 Germans, living in the Saar territory. There was then, until about 2 years ago, little doubt that the Saar would, according to the Treaty of Versailles, return to Germany. There was until January, 1933, no Saar problem.

As far as the eventual plebiscite was concerned, even the French realized quite clearly that since the slogan "The Saar to France" had no weight with the Saarlanders, their only chance was the support of the so-called "Status-quo provision", the support of those who favored a continuation of the League regime. Now, as far as my personal experiences go—as a sovereign the League of Nations has not, during the 15 years of its regime, proved a popular success in the Saar. In more cases than one the Commission has thought fit to rule on a non-democratic basis, paying little if any attention to the elected National Assembly, the Landesrat, which was during all its 4 periods 100% German. The innumerable points of friction between the Commission and the Saar population have made the Commission rule extremely unpopular with the majority of the

Saarlanders and, I may add, even if we disregard the local failure of the League Commission to win popularity, it remains doubtful whether the League as presently constituted may be considered a permanent form of international co-operation, and it seems to me not less doubtful whether it can ever be a suitable ruler.

If, then, you will ask me, if it was 2 years ago a foregone conclusion that the Saar would unconditionally return by an overwhelming vote to Germany, would it not have been wiser and more in the interest of the two contracting parties to have settled the Saar question by direct Franco-German negotiations long before the plebiscite? It would indeed have saved the two countries and the world at large a great deal of unnecessary friction and economic danger. But two considerations made such a step, at least from the French point of view, inadvisable.

First—Any such agreement would constitute a French admission that, with some amount of political common sense and good will, certain questions of European importance could be settled without clinging stubbornly to the letter of the Treaty of Versailles. It would strengthen the case of those who believe in a gradual revision of the Treaty, and although France in reality had already in 1928 by the conclusion of various economic agreements concerning the Saar "changed" the Treaty, she would be most unwilling to admit such a course of policy.

But *secondly*—the establishment of the Hitler regime in Germany and the emigration of a few thousand discontented Germans to the Saar territory, gave new and somewhat unexpected strength to the case of those who support, — not a submission to France, but the continuation of the League rule.

Not in the opinion of the majority of the Saarlanders, but of those who gladly seized an opportunity of freely expressing their dissatisfaction with the existing conditions in Germany, the Saar problem and indeed the Saar crisis began on the 30th January, 1933, with the inauguration of Hitler as Reich's Chancellor.

I am not here concerned in any sense with the development of internal conditions in Germany since that day —

but in spite of my extreme unwillingness to expose myself to a one-sided criticism, I hope to be forgiven for saying that I feel that the establishment of the Nazi regime in Germany seems to have stimulated profoundly the not always impartial interest of the public opinion of the world in yesterday's plebiscite. Had it not been for the thousands of Swastikas in the Saar territory, had it not been for the sudden interest in the most despicable of all professional trouble makers, the political emigré, who in the columns of not a few of our contemporaries over-night became the hero of all that is still human and independent in the German, — had it not been for the fact that until quite recently the world frankly wished to regard the Saar as a test case for the strength of the present German regime, public opinion would today be as indifferent to the Saar as it was ten or more years ago with regard to the plebiscites in East Prussia and Silesia.

I do not for a moment wish to minimize the extremely lively and more often than not desperate struggle between the pro and anti-Nazi Saarlanders. The establishment of Hitler in Germany coincided with the beginning of a vast propaganda campaign for a more or less unconditional return of the "German Saar" to Germany. Every single German was informed by innumerable means of the issues at stake. Once or twice a week a whole evening's program, or quite recently a whole day's program, was devoted to the Saar. German newspapers and news reels, posters and pamphlets, always under the slogan "The Saar is German" reminded every citizen of his duties to work for a speedy return of the territory. On Aug. 26th a mass demonstration was organized with customary German thoroughness: 127 special trains brought 120,000 Saarlanders, (free of charge), to hear Hitler at the German Ehrenbreitstein, and relays of runners from all points in Germany arrived with messages of encouragement and loyalty to their brethren in the "German Saar". Furthermore, thousands of Saar children were during the Summer accommodated for a few weeks holidays in German families all over the country.

No wonder that such encouragement from the Reich

itself should have given at least new moral strength to those Saarlanders who wished for an unconditional return to the Fatherland.

In the Summer of 1933, the national Socialist party, which had existed for more than 7 years, dissolved and combined with 3 other groups to form the so-called "German Front". In the following October, the Catholic Center party likewise decided to dissolve, most of its members joining the "German Front" which, by May 15, 1934, claimed 455,000 members, that is about 93% of all voters.

The Opposition, the so-called "United Front"; stood under the leadership of Max Braun, editor of *The Volksstimme*, and the Communist Fritz Pfordt, editor of the *Arbeiter Zeitung*. Their propaganda for a vote in favor of the Status Quo (a return of the Saar to France was almost universally admitted to be an impossibility) warned voters of the consequences of incorporation in the Third Reich. Some well-known Germans in exile abroad filed on Sept. 21, the front page of *The Volksstimme* with a manifesto advising the Saarlanders to vote against a return to Germany. I leave it to you to judge such extraordinary activities.

Clashes, sometimes of a very drastic nature, were an everyday occurrence during the past year — clashes as a rule between the well organized members of the "German Front" and those who continued, in spite of the measures taken in the neighboring Germany, their faith in Communism and Social democracy. The Spiritual guidance for the united anti-Nazi Front was generally supplied by those who, for one reason or another, had preferred to leave Germany in 1933.

Newspapers attacking the Hitler regime were soon founded in the Saar territory. The "Saar Louis Journal" paid with French capital, the "Westland", later the "Grenzland", so-called independent German Weekly, and a great many similar publications; spread the slogans which soon became characteristic of the Nazi opposition in the Saar; "German we wish to remain, but never to return to this regime of blood and terror", or, more plainly still; "Vote against the Concentration Camp." The number of politi-

cal refugees in the Saar is difficult to gauge. They had, of course, according to the provisions of the Treaty, no right to vote—only those being allowed to vote who had their residence in the Saar territory on June 28, 1919—but their activities have, nevertheless, been widespread, and, in a sense, quite impressive. It was their misfortune that their organization was never as unified as that of the pro-Nazis. Their small and artificially duplicated associations could scarcely hope to win more than a nominal fraction of the voters.

It is often, and even in official exposés, maintained that not only Communists and Social democrats, but particularly Catholics (who, as you remember, comprise some 73% of the territory) would, on account of the difficulties which the Catholics here and there have in the Reich itself, vote against Hitler. From my own experiences I think I can say that even to the Catholic in the Saar, innate patriotism and considerations of nationality are unquestionably stronger than the attraction of a temporarily more pleasing regime. The Vatican, naturally concerned with the issues at stake, has maintained a Papal Emissary in the territory who, possibly to stress his merely observatory function, called himself "The Eyes and the Ears of the Holy Father but not his Mouth".

Both by means of memoranda and protests of one kind and another, the two parties, pro and anti-Nazis, have frequently accused each other of acts of terrorism and subversive activities. No more concrete case against the activities of the pro-Nazis has ever been set up than that which in September of last year revealed the fact that almost the entire organization of the German Front was modelled along the lines of the old officially dissolved Nazi party, that the German Government had offered to enroll 10,000 Saarlanders in the German Volunteer Labor Corps to receive special attention and instruction with a view to the "Saar Campaign" and that "active boycotting" methods had been used in order to bring so great an influence to bear on cinema proprietors that they would without exception place their theatres at the disposal of the 'German Front' for the plebiscite struggle."

I do not propose to exonerate completely the "German Front" organization from the countless complaints against its dominating activities. Both its militant opponents, of whom I have spoken, and the governing Commission, have not infrequently cited instances of somewhat unfortunate tactics. Amongst the complaints on the other side made in return by the "German Front", was a statement that the investigations, from which the Commission had drawn its conclusions, had been made by political emigrés and Marxist officials, whose attitude towards Germany was obvious and who had been allowed to "flood" the Saar. The Commission had indeed made the tactical mistake of enlisting 18 political refugees as officers in the international police force. But wherever the guilt may be, I should like you to visualize without prejudice the enormous difficulties of the situation; over 90% of the voting population wishing a return to Germany, fighting the quite equally bitter opposition of a small minority, and, at the same time, having to defend its own activities against a League of Nations' Commission, which being composed of human beings could not help sharing the reluctance of a great many good internationalists to view the new German course with suspicion and animosity. There is, in my opinion, little value in enquiring into the question of guilt—only one point might, with your permission, easily be raised: if, for one reason or another, those comparatively few German anti-Nazis in the Saar thought it desirable to oppose a return to the Reich, and if their primary aim was a continuation of the League rule, who supported them financially? Admittedly, the League has as yet no right to make any propaganda for its own institution, Germany could scarcely be expected to aid them, international funds were not obtainable to any extent, the only source of both moral and financial support, apart from the chests of the diminished trade unions, and a few private individuals who would sacrifice their last penny for the anti-Hitler cause—the only organization which actively supported the Status Quo had a most characteristic and curious name. It was called "Association Française de la Saare". But whereas the "German Front" naturally worked for a return

to Germany, this "Association Française" had on its posters, which you could see not only in the territory itself but all over France, as its slogan "La Saare aux Saarois". "The Saar to the Saarlanders"—presumably to the 150,000 imaginary inhabitants with which M. Clemenceau so skillfully surprised both Wilson and Lloyd George.

From March, 1933, onwards the governing Commission felt obliged to take measures to cope with the increasing tension within the territory. The Commission decreed an Arms Act, a ban on political meetings of the extreme parties, a ban on the wearing of party uniforms and badges, suspension of certain newspapers, and similar measures. But it was not until June, 1934, that a Franco-German agreement settled the problem of international friction which had arisen during the previous year in connection with the plebiscite. The impatience of the Hitler government to welcome the Saar back to Germany seemed at one time to make it not improbable that a few formations of Storm Troopers might invade the Saar territory and, with the help of an overwhelmingly favorable population, declare it German without any regard to the provisions of the Treaty. Such a *Coup de main* would have shaken the entire structure of European diplomacy—the Treaty of Versailles would have been practically declared null and void. French troops were reported to be ready to counteract such a German move, but fortunately nothing of the sort happened. Nevertheless, to avoid any possible danger of unwarranted invasion from the German side, the wearing of the brown shirt and Nazi gatherings of any kind within 25 miles outside the Saar frontier were forbidden by Germany, and, upon the initiative of the British Government on Dec. 8th, invitations were issued by the League Council to the British, Dutch, Italian and Swedish Governments, each to supply a contingent of police troops to safeguard, if necessary, order and peace during the plebiscite. The relief from the very real tension in Europe was universal.

Moreover, the irresponsible threats of not a few militant Nazis in the Saar territory to persecute, in the event of a German victory, those members of parties who had

more or less openly declared themselves in favor of a Status Quo solution, threats against Communists, Jews and political opponents in general, were silenced by an official German declaration to the effect that, for at least one year from the day of the plebiscite, any opponent to the possible Nazi regime should be left in peace and would not be discriminated against on racial, religious or political grounds.

Today, gentlemen, the plebiscite is over. The ballots have been counted, months of friction and anxiety have come to an end. Germany will, in all probability, resume the sovereignty over the Saar Basin. The bill for the plebiscite, amounting to something like one and a half million dollars, will have to be paid by all three powers concerned—Germany, France and the League: the 55,000 people not now resident in the Saar but under the provisions of the Statute entitled to vote there yesterday, who had travelled from all parts of the world like Joseph and Mary to their Bethlehem, are on their way home. The enormous propaganda machinery, the German and the French broad-casting Stations, the Press, the Screen, the party offices, the foreign troops—they have all done their share and, within a few weeks, the Saarlanders, relieved from the burden of political troubles, will celebrate, in the fashion of all good Rhinelanders, the arrival of Prince Carnival.

And the winner of the plebiscite—who is it? It is Germany—there was never any doubt that the German Saarlanders would overwhelmingly vote for the Fatherland. Is it France who is released from an often awkward and embarrassing obligation, or is it by any chance the League of Nations?

Let us hope that the winner is Europe at large, but let us above all realize the tremendous responsibilities which were upon that instrument of European co-operation—the League of Nations. The League—one should say it frankly—has tried always to act as fairly as it seemed possible. It has not always escaped the accusation of acting as the agent of French rather than Saar interests, but once called upon to function as an active international

mediator, it has to a certain extent proved itself capable of such a task. More than once it seemed that the Saar question would lay bare all those fatal weaknesses from which the League has suffered ever since its creation. Weaknesses which are apparent to everyone, and most of all to those of us who are its friends and supporters. Its most dangerous principle being the equality of vote accorded to all the members. Especially during its dealings with the Saar problem, the absence of Germany and the U.S.A. became a painful handicap. Japan has left, Italy is dissatisfied, Poland may retire, but the worst feature of the League seems to be that in its present form it tends to perpetuate *ad infinitum* the Treaty of Versailles. The moral of the Saar problem therefore is: make it possible for the U.S.A. and Germany to participate by reforming the League, by revising the Treaty, or else they will soon be, to use a word of the great Disraeli, "not only dead but damned". This time, in the case of the Saar, the League won in spite of the Treaty. Unless you reform it, it will die because of it.

The Saar has indeed been a test case. It has not only shown the strength and weakness of the League, but it has proved again that Franco-German relations are by the very nature of European politics, the key to peace or war in the world. It has shown that the political welfare of Europe cannot in the future depend on the letters of the treaty, but on a flexible co-operation between France and Germany, and on the sound application of the principle of international equality.

Gentlemen, it is not sound international policy to prevent nations from pursuing a certain course, or to blame them for acting on the strength of their convictions. The best politician, to speak with Bismarck, does not prevent but makes provision. The best policy is to provide reasonable channels for international collaboration. The best policy, whether for the people of Europe or for us in Canada, is not to fight parties or labels, not to fight shadows in the wind, but to accept realities.

The Saar problem has been settled at last, but the pitiful inadequacy of the Treaty remains. More than 15 years

have elapsed since Versailles, a new generation has grown up which naturally asks itself if the spirit of 1914 is to be perpetuated in eternity by a most questionable Treaty. The problem with which Europe is faced, now that the Saar is settled, now that economic conditions seem to improve everywhere, is not Fascism, Communism or any other ism—it is the question whether those weeks of tension and fearful anticipation, of suspicion and animosity which preceded yesterday's plebiscite, will become permanent because of the rigidity of an admittedly inadequate organization of Europe. The alternative in my opinion both of Europe and the world at large, is: Revision or war.

But one more word; Since the Versailles Treaty there have been many periods of acute and dangerous political friction between France and Germany—in the economic field agreement has always proved to be comparatively easy. No two great nations in Europe are by the very nature of their economic life so well fitted for collaboration as the two central states of Europe. After a definite settlement of the Saar question, no territorial problem exists between France and Germany. Would it be expecting too much of human ingenuity to imagine that the Saar, the political question having been settled, should be used as a stepping stone towards a still closer collaboration between those two old enemies in Europe?

The world cannot recover from the appalling evils—consequences of the world war—from which we have been suffering since the unwise Versailles settlement, unless a reasonable and lasting peace can be established between France and Germany.

Let us hope that courage, vision and faith will reach such a peace before it is too late.

CHAIRMAN:—Gentlemen, we have listened to a most interesting and comprehensive account of this whole problem and we are particularly pleased to have had this interpretation from one of Dr. Lange's experience and background. I am sure I speak on behalf of all of you when I extend our sincere thanks.